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Chapter 1: Introduction
A home purchase is the most significant investment made by most households.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau up to 66% of residential home ownership is
financed by residential mortgages.1 Residential mortgages are secured debt contracts
where the property serves as a collateral for the loan. It is well known that debt
contracts induce moral hazard in the contracting environment. In this paper, we
study the moral hazard resulting from strategic default, renegotiation of contracts,
and the mitigation of these inefficiencies in the presence of recourse. A borrower is
said to strategically default on his debt payments if the borrower’s decision to default
is driven by his unwillingness to pay rather than his inability to pay. Banks rationally
price this strategic default into the initial terms of the contract, and the price for
the strategic default is paid ex-ante by the borrowers. After a default, the lender
repossesses the home using a legal process known as foreclosure. Foreclosure is a
complex, time consuming and expensive process for both the bank and the borrower.
Dead-weight foreclosure costs can be delayed if the bank and the homeowner can
successfully renegotiate the terms of the mortgage. Contract renegotiations, while
efficient ex-post, can increase the ex-ante cost to the borrower; it is not credible
1http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/construction_housing.html
1
for banks to commit to not renegotiate ex-post. This dynamic consistency problem
further distorts the incentives of the borrowers by making it lucrative for them to
sue ex-post for renegotiation. This inefficiency is also priced into the initial terms
of the contract and is reflected in the ex-ante coupon rates and loan-to-value ratio.
the ability of banks to sue the borrower and get a deficiency judgement against him,
alleviates some of this distortion. The pursuit of a deficiency judgement, henceforth
“lender recourse”, converts the gap between the value of the foreclosed home and
the value of the debt into an unsecured loan which enables the bank’s access to
the borrower’s personal assets to pay for this shortfall. Recourse makes default less
desirable from the perspective of the borrower and reduces some of the deadweight
loss due to strategic default and foreclosure. This feeds back into the ex-ante coupon
rate and loan-to-value ratio.
In this paper we model strategic default and renegotiation in residential mort-
gage contracts and study how the features of recourse and the balance of bargaining
power alleviate some of the incentive problems associated with debt and renegotia-
tion. Our model is a continuous time infinite horizon game of endogenous strategic
default and renegotiation. We derive closed form solutions. We have two state
variables, the house price and the borrower’s income. The house price is a geomet-
ric Brownian motion while the homeowner’s income is a continuous time Markov
chain that switches between n states. Homeowner income is assumed to be not con-
tractible. The homeowner derives a psychic utility from ownership over renting. He
enters into a mortgage contract because he either has insufficient funds to buy the
house with his own funds or chooses not to use all of his funds to do so. We have no
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savings in the model. The homeowner is risk neutral and consumes all of his cash
flows. The debt contract is a perpetuity with a constant coupon rate and some fixed
face value. The homeowner endogenously chooses at every instant whether to stay
current in the contract or to exit the contract via selling the house and prepaying
the loan or by defaulting on his coupon payments and suing for renegotiation. In
the event of renegotiation, the homeowner and the lender renegotiate the coupon
rate. Renegotiation imposes a fixed cost on the participants. We examine a variety
of bargaining power regimes during renegotiation, ranging from the bank having
monopoly power to the bank pricing the renegotiation at a competitive rate. We
also study contracts without a renegotiation feature, ignoring the ex-post incentives
the bank would have to enter into a renegotiation. In contracts without renegoti-
ation or when renegotiations fail, we assume that the debt contract ends and the
foreclosure process is initiated. The house is possessed by the bank which sells it
to recoup some of its investment back. Foreclosure is assumed to be costly on both
the banks and the borrowers. We study foreclosure regimes with and without lender
recourse.
Our model is a sequential game in continuous time; our equilibrium concept is
a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Our model produces a rich set of results. We
find that in the absence of recourse, the homeowner’s default decision is independent
of his personal wealth. We also find that in regimes with recourse, the homeowners
stay in the homes longer before defaulting. We show that under recourse, there are
lower default rates, lower coupon rates, higher debt capacity and increased welfare.
An implication of higher debt capacity under recourse is that there are potentially
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higher default rates in these states. When the homeowner’s income is stochastic, we
find that he defaults at a lower price when his income is high and the lender can gar-
nish more of it. When his income is high, however, he sells his house at a lower price
since the option to default is even further out of the money in the high income state.
We find that, when the homeowner has high bargaining power during renegotiation,
contracts with renegotiation violate the bank’s individual rationality constraint and
are not offered in equilibrium. On the other hand, when the bank has high bargain-
ing power, contracts with renegotiation are an improvement over contracts without
renegotiation. Increased homeowner bargaining power during renegotiation distorts
their incentives and turns out to be inefficient as the moral hazard is priced into
the initial coupon rate. Bargaining power is clearly an important determination
of the feasibility of a mortgage modification program and subsequent default rates.
A legal regime that enables lender recourse reduces homeowner bargaining power
during a renegotiation. Lender recourse removes the incentives of the homeowner
to engage in foreclosure stripping and increases the reservation value of the bank in
the renegotiation process.
Our results are consistent with some of the empirical results in Ghent and
Kudlyak (2011). Ghent and Kudlyak estimate a probit model using loan level data
on a sample of over 3 million U.S. mortgages. Consistent with the predictions of
our model, they find that borrowers in recourse states have slightly lower average
FICO scores and slightly higher LTVs at origination. Our model predicts that for
a given level of leverage, recourse states with have lower default but for a given
house our model predicts that recourse states will have higher leverage and thus
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the equilibrium default rates can be higher than in the no-recourse states. Ghent
and Kudlyak find that default probabilities are 1.32 times higher where there is
no threat of recourse and there is negative equity in the house but unconditionally
Ghent and Kudlyak find no difference between the default rates in the recourse
and non-recourse states. Interestingly, they find no evidence that interest rates
are lower in recourse states. This is consistent with our model where at optimal
leverage levels, the coupon rates are similar in recourse and no-recourse states but
controlling for leverage, the recourse states have a lower coupon rate. Ghent and
Kudlyak find that for properties appraised lower than 200K there is no difference in
impact of recourse. This is also consistent with our model since lower valued homes
are bought by people with lower incomes and when there is sufficiently low income
to be garnished, there is little impact on the default behavior of the borrower.
In a related paper, Hatchondo, Martinez and Sanchez (2010) look at the in-
fluence of recourse rules on a mortgage market in a discrete time, infinite horizon,
overlapping generation equilibrium model. They numerically solve their model and
calibrate it to fit empirically observed ratios. They find that as the lender is al-
lowed to garnish more from a defaulting households income, the default probability
declines while home ownership and welfare increases. Our research agenda, while
similar to theirs, differs in three important respects. Firstly, we look at the in-
fluence and interaction of contract renegotiation with recourse rules and strategic
default incentives. Secondly, we model prepayment jointly with strategic default
enabling us to study the interaction in equilibrium of these two aspects of the con-
tract. Thirdly, our results are closed form, enabling us to analyze a rich array of
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comparative statics results. In other related literature, Corbae and Quintin (2012)
calibrate an overlapping generations model with earnings shocks and quantify the
influence of non-traditional mortgage contracts with low down payments and de-
layed amortization on foreclosure rates. They find that lender recourse reduces
mortgage rates and foreclosure rates fall substantially. Earlier work by Clauretie
(1987), Jones (1993), and Ambrose, Capone, and Deng (2001) look empirically at
differences in defaults across states in the U.S.A. Clauretie (1987) estimates a linear
regression model of aggregate state default rates and finds that whether or not a
state permits a deficiency judgment does not significantly affect the state’s default
rate. Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone (1997) find that the probability of default is
a decreasing function of the probability of obtaining a deficiency judgment.
Theoretical work on the pricing of mortgages as derivative assets started with
Epperson et al. (1985) and Kau et al. (1992, 1995). These papers took the house
price and the short rate as the underlying stochastic state variables and derived
the value of the mortgage to the borrower and lender, given optimal exercise of
the options to default and to prepay. They arrived at the continuous fundamental
partial differential equation which usually did not admit analytical solutions and
were solved numerically. Our model extends this literature in three main directions.
Firstly, we have analytical solutions because we solve a system of linked ordinary
differential equations instead of a partial differential equation. This enables us
to have explicit analytical solutions, despite having two state variables. Our two
variables are the house price and borrower income but our model can be easily
extended to include a spot rate which is a continuous time Markov chain. Secondly,
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we study renegotiation of contracts, which was not studied in these seminal papers.
Thirdly, we look at the impact of recourse on strategic default. One shortcoming of
our approach is that we do not explicitly study the time dependency, which is an
important aspect of a borrowers financial decisions. Consistent with this literature,
we model the default and prepayment options simultaneously.
Another strand of literature that relates to mortgage renegotiation and bar-
gaining power is one of competitiveness in the banking industry. Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan (1992) argue that relationship lending gives banks a monopoly on informa-
tion about their borrowers and therefore give banks bargaining power over the firm’s
profits. The benefits to the firm of the banks having an increased bargaining power
are manifested in the firm’s lower likelihood of being liquidity constrained as shown
in the case of Japanese banks by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990,1991). A
downside of outside bank competition or the loss of bank bargaining power is the
distortion of borrower incentives. If the lenders are arm’s length lenders then man-
agement can indulge in empire building and risk shifting. Our renegotiation results
are similar to this literature as we capture the upside of bank’s bargaining power
and how it mitigates the moral hazard problem with debt. We find that high ex-
post homeowner bargaining power distorts their incentives to strategically default
and the surplus extracted ex-post by the homeowner is captured by the bank via
higher initial mortgage rates. In our model, when the bank has monopoly renegoti-
ation power or sufficiently high bargaining power, it leads to a welfare improvement
over contracts without renegotiation. The housing context does not have the debt
overhang problems related with this literature.
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The repayment incentives of borrowers and the debt restructuring issues that
we study in our paper are also related to similar issues studied in sovereign debt con-
tracts. Strategic default in a sovereign debt is first studied by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). Sovereign default is legal by definition and lenders do not have any collateral
as they cannot confiscate any national assets. Payment incentives in these markets
are primarily said to be driven by a threat to the sovereign of loss of access to
international capital markets and disruption of international trading opportunities.
These effects are similar to what a homeowner faces in the event of a severe loss in
their credit score. Kletzer and Wright (2000) show that permanent credit embargoes
are not credible threats because the gains from risk-sharing that motivate lending
in the first place give incentives for forgiveness and new lending. Sovereign debt
renegotiation suffers from co-ordination, free riding and hold out problems between
myriad lenders that are absent in residential mortgage contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the game
and looks at contracts without renegotiation. Chapter 3 looks at contracts with
renegotiation. Chapter 4 contains all numerical results and our conclusions. Finally,
we have the appendices with some derivations.
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Chapter 2: Strategic default in contracts without renegotiation. Con-
stant income and Stochastic income
2.1 The Game
2.1.1 Timeline
The bank and the homeowner play a sequential game. Both the homeowner
and the bank are risk neutral. The homeowner has a higher time discount pa-
rameter than the bank. Going forward we use the words borrower and homeowner
interchangeably. We also use the words bank and lender interchangeably henceforth.
The borrower is interested in homeownership because he derives a psychic utility
from ownership over renting. The borrower may ask the bank for a loan because he
has insufficient funds to purchase the house outright or he might prefer to finance
the purchase via some amount of debt because of his high time discount parameter.
When homeowner approaches the bank for a loan of a given face value, the bank
offers the homeowner a debt contract which is a perpetuity with a fixed coupon
rate. The debt contract may have up to one provision for renegotiation. This ini-
tial rate is assumed to price debt competitively at par. If this contract meets the
homeowner’s individual rationality constraint then the game begins. From this time
9
onwards, time is continuous and at each instant the homeowner decides if he wants
to stay current on his coupon payments or exit the contract. The contract can be
exited in two ways. The first way is to sell the house. The homeowner could sell the
house and repay the face value of the loan. The second way to exit the contract is to
default on the payments. If the contract did not have a provision for renegotiation
then this action would take both the agents straight into the foreclosure process.
The foreclosure is settled according to whether the legal regime allows for lender
recourse. If the initial debt contract did have a provision for renegotiation then the
bank and the borrower renegotiate the coupon rate. The homeowner chooses the
sale and default boundary endogenously and optimally. The bank can rationally
anticipate the borrower’s actions for a given choice of coupon rate. Therefore the
coupon that the banks choose and the boundaries that the borrower chooses are
best mutual responses to each other and our equilibrium is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. We solve for this equilibrium using dynamic programming. We derive
a system of linked ordinary differential equations that the borrower’s value function
satisfies and then solve for the borrower’s value function.
2.1.2 Sale boundary
The borrower can sell the home at any point and pay the lender the face value
of the loan. The borrower makes up for any shortfall on his own account. Since
the borrower has a high time discount parameter, for high enough house prices the
borrower has an incentive to realize the difference between the market price of the
10
house and his lower valuation in terms of current consumption.
2.1.3 Default boundary
The borrower can also choose to simply default on his at any point in time.
If the default leads to foreclosure then both the bank and the borrower suffer fixed
dead-weight costs. If the bank and the borrower successfully renegotiate a new
coupon then they incur a small renegotiation cost. It is easy to see that when the
homeowner has negative equity, he would prefer defaulting over selling and when he
has high positive equity that he would prefer to sell the house rather than default.
2.1.4 Recourse
There are two foreclosure regimes that we study in this model. In the first
no-recourse regime, the bank has possession of the house and the homeowner is able
to walk away from his obligation. In the second, recourse regime, the bank is able
garnish some constant amount of the homeowner’s future wages. This amount, Ie,
is assumed to be independent of the current house price or the homeowner’s income.
It is an upper limit to the extent to which the bank can recoup its losses. The bank
can go after the borrower’s wealth to make up for its shortfall, up to this amount
Ie. In equilibrium we see that, given Ie, the homeowner picks a default house price
such that the garnishment limit is passed and the bank is left with some shortfall.
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Figure 2.1: The Game





























2.1.5 Renegotiation: bargaining power
If the debt contract has a provision for renegotiation then the bank and the
homeowner try to arrive at a new coupon so that their individual rationality con-
straints are met and that they can share the surplus from delaying the dead-weight
loss associated with foreclosure. We introduce a parameter γ that captures the
homeowner’s bargaining power. We study the extreme cases when the bank prices
the new loan as a monopolist or when the homeowner has all the bargaining power
and the loan is priced as if the bank was operating in a competitive market. Then we
study the cases with intermediate bargaining power where the two agents are able




There are two risk neutral agents in our model. The borrower who takes a
loan F to buy a house of value H0 and the lender who offers a loan with face value
F and coupon rate c. The borrower has the wealth to make the down payment of
d = H0 − F but needs financing for the remaining amount. The borrower derives a
psychic utility from owning over renting a home (see Figure 2.3). The house Price
follows a geometric Brownian motion. The model has an infinite horizon and is in
continuous time. The debt contract is a perpetuity with the provision for a one-
time1 costly loan renegotiation. At each instant in time, the borrower has the choice
of staying current on his loan, selling the home to a third party or defaulting on his
loan. To stay current on his loan, the homeowner needs to keep making payments to
the bank at the constant coupon rate. If the homeowner decides to sell the home, he
will have to pay the bank the face-value, F , of the loan from the proceeds of the sale
while the difference will be credited to or debited from his personal wealth. When
the homeowner chooses to default for the first time, the bank and the homeowner
can renegotiate a new coupon. If the homeowner defaults a second time, the bank
forecloses on the house. Renegotiation and foreclosure impose fixed dead-weight
costs on both the agents.
The model timeline is as follows(see Figure 2.1): The borrower approaches
the bank for a loan to buy a house. The borrower has insufficient funds to buy
1The model extends easily to any fixed finite number of renegotiations. We ignore the time
inconsistency of the agents pre-committing to any such number ex-ante.
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the house out right. The borrower derives a psychic utility from ownership that he
does not receive from renting a home. Any tax advantage from home ownership
can be thought of as subsumed in this psychic utility. The lender offers a mortgage
contract to the borrower. A contract is a perpetuity with a fixed coupon rate c and
a face value of debt F . The debt contract has one provision for a borrower initi-
ated renegotiation. The borrower also has the option to terminate the contract by
selling the house at any time and paying off the face value of the loan. Finally, the
borrower can default on the loan at any time of his choosing. A failed renegotiation
or a second default leads to the house being foreclosed. Foreclosure is costly to both
the lender and the borrower. The lender loses funds in administrative and legal fees
while the borrower’s creditworthiness takes a non-trivial hit.
2.2.1 State variables
2.2.1.1 House Price
The house price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, where r is the
risk free rate and δ > 0 is the rental rate that the homeowner saves on by living in
the house or earns by renting the house out.
dHt = (r − δ)Ht dt+ σHt dWt (2.1)
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We assume that the risk free rate is deterministic.
dBt = rBt dt (2.2)
2.2.1.2 Income Process
The borrower earns an income at one of two possible constant rates. A high
rate ie and a low rate iu, where the subscripts e and u signify employment and un-
employment. We refer to the high income rate state as the employed state and the
lower income rate state as the unemployed state. When the borrower is employed,
there is chance of arrival of unemployment with a Poisson arrival rate of λu. Simi-
larly, when the borrower is unemployed, there is a chance of securing employment
with a Poisson arrival rate of λe. The income process is independent of the house
price. The borrower’s income process is a two state continuous time Markov chain(
see Figure 2.2). The set up can be extended to an n-state chain. The present value
of future income, if the current income state is high (low) is denoted by It = Ie (Iu).
Proposition 2.2.1. The present value of future income, given some current state
of employment and a discount rate of ρ, is given as follows. Ie is the present value





− (ie − iu)λe







ρ(ρ+ λe + λu)
(2.4)
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Jump with Poisson arrival rate Λe
Jump with Poisson arrival rate Λu
Low Income High Income
Figure 2.2: Income Process
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2.2 Borrower characteristic
A key feature of the borrower is that he is risk neutral. This feature takes
away any insurance motives from the borrower’s actions. Borrower’s decisions are
purely strategic. The next important feature is that the borrower’s time discount
parameter is higher than the risk free rate. This higher discount rate creates motives
for the borrower to take on debt and to sell the house when the price is high enough.
The final important characteristic is the psychic utility that the borrower derives
from ownership. This is taken to be a function of the house price. It is zero when
the house is worthless and it steadily but sub-linearly increases as the house price
increases, indicating a relative satiation in the status or other happiness that the
homeowner can derive from having a bigger and better house. In out numerical
results, we have taken the instantaneous rate of psychic utility to be ψ(H) = Hp
where p = 0.15 or 0.25 were used. The present value of Psychic Utility, if you


























YHHL = H p




Figure 2.3: Psychic Utility from home ownership
2.2.3 Homeowner Utility Function
Let U(·) be the instantaneous utility function, which is of class C2, and let ρ
be the discount rate. The homeowner’s optimization problem is to pick the optimal





e−ρtU(it − cF + ψ(Ht) + δHt)dt
+ e−ρ(τ1∧τ2)
(
f1(Hτ1 , Iτ1)1τ1<τ2 + f2(Hτ2 , Iτ2)1τ1>τ2
)]
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where it − cF + ψ(Ht) + δHt is the instantaneous cashflow the homeowner derives
from owning a mortgaged home. We assume that the homeowner is risk neutral, i.e.
U(x) ≡ x. f1(·, ·) is the boundary payoff in the event of default, while f2(·, ·) is the
boundary payoff in the event of prepayment.
f1(Ht, It) =

−CF + It +max[Ht − F, 0] in a No-Recourse regime
−CF +max[Ht + It − F, 0] in a Recourse regime
J0(Ht, It) in the event of a successfuly renegotiation
f2(Ht, It) = It +Ht − F Sale payoff is independent of the legal regime
2.2.4 Debt Valuation
For a given contract, and given optimal behavior of the homeowner, we calcu-
late the present value of debt, V (H0, I0) as given below:







g1(Hτ1 , Iτ1)1τ1<τ2 + g2(Hτ2 , Iτ2)1τ1>τ2
)]
18
where cF is the instantaneous cashflow the bank derives from mortgage payments
and τ1 and τ2 come from the homeowner’s optimization. g1(·, ·) is the boundary




−CFL+min[Ht, F ] in a No-Recourse regime
−CFL+min[Ht + It, F ] in a Recourse regime
V0(Ht, It) in the event of a successfuly renegotiation
g2(Ht, It) = F Sale payoff is independent of the legal regime
2.3 Constant Income: Contracts without renegotiation
2.3.1 No Recourse regime
In our continuous time setting, the homeowner has to decide at each instant if
he should stay current on his debt or exit the contract via sale or default(see Figure
2.4). The Bellman principle optimizes over the trade-off between exiting at a point
or staying on and acting optimally an instant later. Figure 2.5 shows the state space
and the possible movement of the borrowers value function. The region of the state
space where the homeowner chooses to stay current is known as the continuation
region. The dotted arrows show the movement of the high income value function
19
Je(H) depending on how the state variables evolve. The lateral movement shows
the case where no income shock arrives in the next instant and only the house price
changes. The vertical move indicates the possibility of an income shock moving us
into a region of the state space with a potentially different low income value function
Ju(H). In the absence of recourse the borrowers boundary choices are not influenced
by his income. As the choice of boundaries and boundary payoffs are identical in
the absence of recourse, we find that Je(H) = Ju(H) + a, were a is a constant that
accounts for the differences in income levels. Since income does not influence any
incentives, we take income to be zero in the no-recourse regime. The homeowner





Income Regime changes at t+∆t
Income Regime doesn't change at t+∆t
Act optimally in new regime
Act optimally in old regime
Figure 2.4: Homeowner’s problem
For a given contract (c1, F ), the borrower faces a free boundary problem and
Bellman equations in equation (2.5) describe his value functions. J ik(Ht) is the
homeowner’s value function when the house price is Ht and his income flows at the
rate i ∈ {iu, ie} and k ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the borrower is in a pre-
renegotiation or post-renegotiation state. The homeowner derives psychic utility
from ownership at the rate of ψ(H).
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e−ρs(ie + ψ(H) + δHt+s − c1F )ds+ e−ρhJe(Ht+h)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸





















e−ρs(iu + ψ(H) + δHt+s − c1F )ds+ e−ρhJu(Ht+h)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸










stay current and income switches
]}
(2.5)




Ht − F At the Sale boundary
It − Cf + max{Ht − F, 0} Foreclosure: No Recourse
−Cf + max{Ht + It − F, 0} Foreclosure: Recourse
J
{e,u}
0 − Cr Post Renegotiation Value Function
and
Cf = dead-weight cost to the homeowner associated with Foreclosure
Cr = dead-weight cost to the homeowner incurred during Renegotiation
Equation (2.5) is the borrowers Bellman equation and it describes the choices of the
borrower in the continuation region. At any instant the borrower chooses between
exiting the contract and accepting the boundary payoff or staying current. If he
stays current and the income state is high, in the next instant he may receive an
income shock and be moved to the low income continuation region or he may sim-
ply move around in the high income continuation region. Whichever portion of the
continuation region he winds up in, the homeowner acts optimally going forward
from that point on. We derive that the value functions represented by the Bellman
equation satisfy a system of linked ordinary differential equations described in Equa-
tion (2.6). These second-order non-homogeneous ordinary differential equations are
known as Euler differential equations.
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Proposition 2.3.1. The home owner’s value functions satisfy the following system






























Proposition 2.3.2. When there is no recourse during default, the borrower’s sale
and default decision are not influenced by his income state. The lender’s value













Since the borrower’s income does not factor into any of the borrower’s decision,
we will take income to be zero for the remainder of this section. We use the method
of variation of parameters to solve these equations. Equation (2.9) represents the
homeowner value function. The first two terms, AHk1 + BHk2 , represent the value
of the option to default on the contract and the value of the option to sell the house.
The next terms, δH
δ+ρ−r + Ψ(H), represent the homeowners subjective valuation of




valuation of the debt burden were he to hold his debt to perpetuity. The constants
A and B are determined by the boundary payoffs. We use value matching and
smooth pasting conditions on the value function to jointly determine the default
boundaries, H0S and H0D, and also the coefficients A and B of the homeowners
value function.
Proposition 2.3.3. The borrower’s value function is as follows:
J(H) = AHk1 +BHk2 +
δH




Where k1 and k2 satisfy the following quadratic





The coefficients A and B, for each level, are determined by the borrower’s choice of
renegotiation, default and sale boundaries.
Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (2.10) represents the valuation of debt from the perspective of the
debt holder. The lender can anticipate borrower default behavior given a contract
and calculate the value of debt. The first two terms, LHk1 + MHk2 , represent the
short position the bank has on the borrowers options to exit the contract and the
third term, cF
r
, is the present value of receiving the debt coupons in perpetuity. The
coefficients are determined by value matching at the default and sale boundaries.
Proposition 2.3.4. The valuation of debt, given a certain coupon and face value
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of debt, is as follows:




The coefficients L and M , for each level, are determined by the borrower’s
choice of renegotiation, default and sale boundaries.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.2 Recourse regime: constant income
The portion of the borrower’s income that is not subject to recourse does not
influence any of his decisions. We lose no generality by ignoring the portion of his
income not subject to recourse. Going forward, we use the term income as the por-
tion of borrower income or wealth that can be garnished by the lender. So constant
income can be interpreted as a limit on the amount that the bank can garnish from
the current wealth of the borrower to cover any deficiency after the foreclosure pro-
cess.
In the continuation region, the equity value function and debt valuation follow
the same laws of motion as they did in the no-recourse regime. The only difference
comes in the default boundary payoffs. The option positions of the bank and the
homeowner have different valuation in this regime and the difference shows up in
the different coefficient values that we get for A,B,L and M .
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2.4 Stochastic Labor Income
The borrower’s income process is a two state continuous time Markov chain.
The set up can be extended to an n-state chain. The borrower earns an income
at one of two possible constant rates. A high rate ie and a low rate iu, where the
subscripts e and u signify employment and unemployment. In the high income state,
there is chance of arrival of a negative income shock with a Poisson arrival rate of
λu. Similarly, in the low income state, there is a chance of a positive income shock
with a Poisson arrival rate of λe. The income process is independent of the house
price. The present value of future income, if the current income state is high (low)
is denoted by It = Ie (Iu).
Proposition 2.4.1. The present value of future income, given some current state
of employment and a discount rate of ρ, is given as follows. Ie is the present value





− (ie − iu)λe







ρ(ρ+ λe + λu)
(2.12)
Theorem 2.4.2. In a No-Recourse regime, the homeowner’s stochastic labor Income
has no impact on his default and sale decisions.
Observation 2.4.3. In a Recourse regime, the homeowner’s Income level impacts
his decision to default and to sell. When the homeowner’s income is high, he defaults
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at a lower house price. When the homeowner’s income is low, he sells at a higher
house price.
In the presence of recourse, the homeowner stands to lose more when he has a
higher income and that incentivizes him to default later. At the sale point, income
does not factor in and the only factor that separates the high income state from the
low income state is the value of the default options. Since the default option has a
higher strike for the low income state, it is more valuable and hence the homeowner
waits longer before giving up that option and selling the house.
The continuation region for the high income and the low income states are
depicted in figure 2.6. In the high income state, the continuation region is the
set of house prices H such that H ∈ [HDD,H0S]. The homeowner defaults
at the price HDD and sells at the price H0S and stays current for intermedi-
ate prices. In the low income state, the continuation region is the set of house
prices H such that H ∈ [H0D,HSS]. The homeowner defaults at the price H0D
and sells at the price HSS and stays current for intermediate prices. Note that,
HDD < H0D < H0S < HSS.
2.4.1 Splitting the continuation region
We split both the continuation regions into two parts. The high income contin-
uation region ranges from HDD to H0S. We split it into the regions [HDD,H0D]
and [H0D,H0S]. The low income continuation region ranges from H0D to HSS.
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Table 2.1: This table lists how, when income is stochastic, the value func-
tion splits in different portions of the domain
High Income Low Income
Range Equity Debt Equity Debt
[HDD,H0D] JD V D None None
[H0D,H0S] Je V e Ju V u
[H0S,HSS] None None JS V S
We split this into the regions [H0D,H0S] and [H0S,HSS].See figure 2.6. We de-
fine Equity and Debt Value functions as follows:
Figure 2.6: Continuation Region with Labor Income uncertainty
2.4.1.1 Smooth Pasting and Value Matching
We have 4 smooth pasting and 4 value matching conditions for Equity at the
boundaries of the continuation regions. These conditions arrive out of No-Arbitrage
and continuity. In addition we have 4 more conditions from the continuity and
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Figure 2.7: Value Matching and Smooth Pasting conditions for Equity
differentiability of the value function in the interior of the continuation region. See
figure 2.7.
For Debt, we have 4 value matching conditions at the boundaries of the con-
30
Table 2.2: This table lists the smooth pasting and value matching condi-
tions for the homeowner’s value function
JD(HDD) = −CF Value Matching
JDH (HDD) = 0 Smooth Pasting
Je(H0D) = JD(H0D) Continuity of Value Function
JeH(H0D) = J
D
H (H0D) Differentiability of Value Function
Je(H0S) = H0S − F + Ie Value Matching
JeH(H0S) = 1 Smooth Pasting
Ju(H0D) = −CF Value Matching
JuH(H0D) = 0 Smooth Pasting
Ju(H0S) = JS(H0S) Continuity of Value Function
JuH(H0S) = J
S
H(H0S) Differentiability of Value Function
Ju(HSS) = HSS + Iu− F Value Matching
JuH(H0S) = 1 Smooth Pasting
Table 2.3: This table lists the smooth pasting and value matching condi-
tions for the bank’s value function
V D(HDD) = HDD − CFL Value Matching
V D(H0D) = V e(H0D) Continuity of Value Function
V DH (H0D) = V
e
H(H0D) Differentiability of Value Function
V e(H0S) = F Value Matching
V u(H0D) = H0D − CFL Value Matching
V u(H0S) = V S(H0S) Continuity of Value Function
V uH(H0S) = V
S
H (H0S) Differentiability of Value Function
V S(HSS) = F Value Matching
V e(H0) = F Individual Rationality constraint
tinuation region. In addition we have 4 more conditions from the continuity and
differentiability of the value function in the interior of the continuation region. In
addition, we have an Individual Rationality constraint for the initial pricing of Debt.
We have a total of 21 constraints. See figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Value Matching and Smooth Pasting conditions for Debt
Proposition 2.4.4. When income is stochastic, the domain of the value functions
splits into four distinct regions. Equity and Debt value functions take the following
functional form. The Hk terms represent the options to sell and default. In addition
to the option, Equity valuation consists of Income, Psychic utility of ownership,
32
private valuation of the house and the private valuation of the debt burden. Equity











































((λu + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
(δ + λu)H








((λe + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
δH

























V D = LD1H
m1 + LD2H
m2 +





where k1, k2 solve the first equation and k3, k4 solve the second equation













m1,m2 satisfy the following characteristic equation
m(m− 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2





2 satisfy the following characteristic equations
m(m− 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2




Chapter 3: Contracts with Renegotiation
3.1 Introduction
In this section we study the impact of the possibility of subsequent renegoti-
ation of mortgage terms on the initial equilibrium mortgage contract. Depending
on how costly renegotiation is, there will always be ex-post efficiency gains to be
made by prolonging the dead-weight costs arising from foreclosure. We hardwire
the number of possible renegotiations to be one though our model can be extended
to a finite number of renegotiations agreed upon in advance. We do not study the
time inconsistency issue that the bank faces when it comes to pre-committing to a
single renegotiation. We limit the renegotiations to be over mortgage rates. Our
main results are that when debt has all the bargaining power then renegotiations
are welfare improving. Contracts with a renegotiation feature is an improvement on
contracts without one. Renegotiation and recourse act like substitutes and contracts
with recourse and renegotiations are optimal. These contracts allow the homeowner
the highest debt capacity. On the other hand when the homeowner has all the
bargaining power, it is optimal for him to default immediately. In the event of
an immediate default, the homeowner is able to extract the surplus from avoiding
foreclosure and the bank does not meet his reservation value. Therefore such con-
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tracts will not be offered by banks. When debt has all the bargaining power, the
bank’s advantageous position post-renegotiation benefits the homeowner ex-ante in
terms of more favorable coupons. As the homeowner bargaining power increases,
the homeowner position post-renegotiation improves but any losses the bank faces is
recaptured by the bank via increased initial mortgage rates. Increased Homeowner
bargaining power leads to earlier renegotiation and higher initial mortgage rates.
Interestingly, we find that there exists an intermediate level of bargaining power
that leads to the highest welfare.
3.2 Model
In contracts with a renegotiation feature, the homeowner faces a choice, at
every instant, between staying current on his loan or exiting the contract. The
homeowner can exit the contract via selling the house or defaulting on his contract
in an effort to renegotiate the contract terms. After the homeowner defaults on
his coupon payments, the homeowner and the bank then attempt to renegotiate a
new coupon rate. In the event that they fail to renegotiate, the house will go into
foreclosure and both parties will receive their foreclosure payoffs. The foreclosure
payoffs are determined by the legal regime. In a No-Recourse regime, the bank gets
the house, if it’s foreclosure sale price is less than the face value of debt, while the
homeowner gets to keep his income and any remaining proceeds from the foreclosure
sale after debt has been pad off. Both parties incur foreclosure costs, which are
higher for the bank. In a Recourse regime, in addition to taking the house, the bank
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will garnish the homeowner’s wages if the foreclosure sale was insufficient to pay the
bank the face-value of debt. It is in the interest of the bank and the homeowner
to delay these foreclosure costs and split the savings between them as dictated by
their bargaining power.
3.3 The Homeowner’s Problem
The homeowner’s problem in a contract with renegotiation is similar to the
problem studied in contracts without renegotiation. The homeowner has to choose
between staying current on his payments or exiting via selling or defaulting and
then renegotiating. In the continuation region, the homeowner’s value functions,
described in equations (3.1) and (3.2), take familiar form. The subscript “1”




























(ρ+ δ − r)
(3.2)
Let H1R be the price at which the homeowner chooses to renegotiate the contract.
H1S is the price at which the homeowner chooses to sell his home when he is under
the original contract. H0D and H0S are the default and sale boundaries chosen
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by the homeowner under the renegotiated contract. The homeowner’s value function
and boundary choices leave us with 8 unknowns: A1, B1, A0, B0, H1R,H1S,H0D,H0S.
Table 3.1: Equity smooth pasting and value matching conditions in con-
tracts with renegotiation
Type of Description of Notation of
Equation Contact Evaluation point point
J1(H) = H − F + Ie Value Matching Original contract H1S
sale point
J1H(H) = 1 Smooth Pasting Original contract H1S
sale point




H(H) Smooth Pasting Original contract H1R
renegotiation point
J0(H) = H − F + Ie Value Matching Renegotiated contract H0S
sale point
J0H(H) = 1 Smooth Pasting Renegotiated contract H0S
sale point
J0(H) = −CF Value Matching Renegotiated contract H0D
default point
J0H(H) = 0 Smooth Pasting Renegotiated contract H0D
default point
From no-arbitrage, we have both smooth pasting and value matching at each of
the four boundaries, giving us 8 equations that determine our unknowns. Table 3.2
lists all the equations. Since every aspect of the renegotiated contract is a function
of the price at which the homeowner chooses to renegotiated and since our post-
renegotiation free boundaries are determined implicitly, the homeowner’s smooth
pasting condition, described in (3.3), at the renegotiation point H1R is evaluated


































































(ρ+ δ − r)
(3.3)
3.4 Bank’s problem
The bank’s problem in a contract with renegotiation is also similar to the
problem studied in contracts without renegotiation. The bank has to choose an
initial coupon anticipating the homeowner’s response to such a coupon choice while
also pricing the coupon so the bank gets its reservation value. When the homeowner
defaults and attempts a renegotiation, the bank will offer a new coupon based on the
relative bargaining powers of the parties involved. The bank will collect its boundary
payments in accordance with the nature of the boundary and the nature of the legal
regime. In the continuation region, the valuation of debt, described in equations
(3.4) and (3.5), takes familiar form. The subscript “1” denotes pre-renegotiation,
while the subscript “0” denotes a post-renegotiation contract.












H1R is the price at which the homeowner chooses to renegotiate the contract. H1S
is the price at which the homeowner chooses to sell his home when he is under the
original contract. H0D and H0S are the default and sale boundaries chosen by the
homeowner under the renegotiated contract. The homeowner’s value function and
boundary choices leave us with 6 unknowns: L1,M1, L0,M0, c0, c1.
The initial coupon, c1, is determined by the bank’s individual rationality constraint
Table 3.2: Debt value matching conditions in contracts with renegotiation
Type of Description of Notation
Equation Contact Evaluation point of point
V 1(H) = F Value Matching Original contract H1S
sale point
V 1(H) = V 0(H)− CRL Value Matching Original contract H1R
renegotiation point
V 0(H) = F Value Matching Renegotiated contract H0S
sale point
V 0(H) = H + Ie − CFL Value Matching Renegotiated contract H0D
default point
described in (3.6). The value of debt at the inception of loan is equal to the value







The renegotiated coupon rate c0 is determined by the relative bargaining power of
the two agents and is discussed in the following section.
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3.5 Bargaining Power
Bargaining power in renegotiation is defined as the ability of the agents to
influence the renegotiated coupon value. In the first extreme case, when the bank has
all the bargaining power, the bank picks the coupon that maximizes his valuation.
Equation (3.7) describes the bank’s valuation of post-renegotiation debt, where





The bank’s first order condition is described in (3.8). In keeping with the termi-
nology used earlier in the paper, H0S is the sale boundary, H0D is the default
boundary, H1R is the price at which the contract was renegotiated, F is the face



































Since the post-renegotiation default and sale boundaries are implicit functions of the





. Recall that the post-renegotiation sale and default boundary are
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determined by a system of simultaneous equations:
F1(H0S,H0D, c0, H1R) = 0 (3.9)
F2(H0S,H0D, c0, H1R) = 0 (3.10)
Let (cd, H0Sd, H0Dd) solve (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10). cd is the renegotiated coupon
rate when the bank has all the bargaining power. On the other hand, when the
homeowner has all the bargaining power, since his valuation decreases monotonically
in the coupon rate, he picks the lowest coupon that satisfies the bank’s individual
rationality constraint and gives the bank its foreclosure payoff. Equation (3.11)





− CRL = H1R− CFL (3.11)
Let (ce, H0Se, H0De) solve (3.11), (3.9) and (3.10). ce is the renegotiated coupon
rate when the homeowner has all the bargaining power. Now for any γ ∈ (0, 1),
cγ = γcd + (1− γ)ce
defines the renegotiated coupon that the homeowner and bank would arrive at when




4.1.1 Contracts without Renegotiation
In contracts without renegotiation, our results are driven by the homeowner’s
optimal choice of option exercise boundaries and his subjective time discount param-
eter. We find that in the presence of recourse, default becomes a lot less lucrative
for the borrower. This incentivizes him to stay longer in the contract. This feeds
back into the initial pricing of the debt contract. As a consequence, the homeowner
enjoys a lower mortgage rate for a given face value of the loan. The lowered debt
burden is reflected in the homeowner taking longer to shed that burden via selling
the house. As a result, under recourse, we see lower mortgage rates, lower default
rates and higher equity valuation. We show that default will never occur when there
is negative equity and the homeowner sells the home only when he has positive eq-
uity. We show that in the presence of recourse the game has a larger continuation
region.
Observation 4.1.1. Lets H0SR, H0SNR, H0DR and H0DNR be the sale and de-
fault boundaries under recourse and no-recourse respectively. For a given coupon, the
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default boundary under a regime without recourse is higher than the default boundary
under a regime with recourse. The sale boundary in the absence of recourse is higher
than in the presence of recourse. The difference in the boundaries is higher at the
default boundary than at the sale boundary.
H0DRec < H0DNo−Rec
H0SRec < H0SNo−Rec
H0DRec −H0DNo−Rec < H0SNo−Rec −H0SRec
Let contract-R be a mortgage contract under renegotiation and let contract-
NR be a contract under a no-renegotiation regime. Given a fixed mortgage rate, both
contracts are identical in their cash flows in the continuation region and also identical
in their payoffs to equity at the sale boundary. The only difference between them
is that the default boundary is uniformly more lucrative in the absence of recourse.
This makes default in contract-NR more attractive as compared to in contract-
R. The more favorable default terms makes the default option more valuable in
contract-NR making continuation at the sale boundary more valuable. This results
in the sale boundary of contract-NR being higher than the sale boundary of contract-
R. The increase in the value of the default put is much higher closer to its exercise
value than away at the sale boundary and that is why the shift in the default
boundary is larger than the shift in the sale boundary.
The changes in the boundary choices of the homeowner under recourse has a
feedback effect on the valuation of debt at the inception of the loan. Debt now has
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a higher value at the beginning of the loan if the legal regime allows for recourse.
Since the initial debt is priced at par, for a given face-value of debt, homeowners
now face a lower mortgage rate. The lower mortgage rate leads to a higher valuation
of equity.
Observation 4.1.2. For a given face-value of debt, the equilibrium mortgage rates
are lower in a regime with recourse as compared to the mortgage rate in a regime
without recourse. The equity values in recourse regimes are higher.
Our next result shows that the homeowner would prefer to take on a mortgage
even if he was able to finance the purchase of the home from his own funds. This
result is driven by the homeowner’s subjective time discount factor being higher than
the risk free rate. For sufficiently low face-value of debt, the homeowner can get a
loan arbitrarily close to the risk free rate. At these low rates, it is lucrative for the
homeowner to increase his current consumption and finance the home purchase via
debt that he values below par. As he loads up on debt, the coupon rate on the entire
debt increases. This reduces his incremental gain from trading intertemporally and
at some point he reaches his optimal debt capacity. If the homeowner were to have
100% debt, the equilibrium mortgage rate is above his subjective discount rate. This
demonstrates that there is an interior optimal debt level. With increasing debt, the
default put that the homeowner owns also increases in value but we show that this
increase is insufficient to compensate the homeowner for the increasing burden of an
increasing mortgage rate that accompanies high levels of leverage. The uniformly
lower mortgage rates under recourse imply that the homeowner has a higher debt
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capacity under recourse.
Observation 4.1.3. There exists an optimal debt level when the legal regime does
not allow for lender recourse.
Observation 4.1.4. Contracts with recourse allow for a higher optimal debt level
than contracts without recourse.
The homeowner and the bank find it ex-post efficient to postpone dead-weight
loss from incurring foreclosure costs by modifying the terms of the contract. Any
ex-post modification is priced into the contract ex-ante. The balance of bargaining
power during renegotiation becomes relevant in determining the ex-ante efficiency of
mortgage renegotiation. We show that when the homeowner has all the bargaining
power, he instantly defaults on his contract and extracts the value of the dead-weight
foreclosure costs from the bank. We also show that contracts without renegotiation
dominate contracts with renegotiation if the borrower has all the bargaining power.
On the other hand, contracts with costless renegotiation are an improvement over
contracts without renegotiation when the bank acts like a monopolist during rene-
gotiation. Homeowner bargaining power is an important determinant of the fea-
sibility of a mortgage modification program and subsequent default rates. Lender
recourse reduces homeowner bargaining power during a renegotiation. Lender re-
course removes the incentives of the homeowner to engage in foreclosure stripping
and increases the reservation value of the bank in the renegotiation process.
Observation 4.1.5. When the homeowner has all the bargaining power, he defaults
immediately and sues for renegotiation. This enables him to instantly extract from
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the bank the dead-weight costs it would incur during foreclosure
Observation 4.1.6. When the homeowner has high bargaining power, the banks
are strictly better off offering contracts without renegotiation or not offering any
contract at all.
Observation 4.1.7. When the bank has monopoly power during renegotiation and
when renegotiation is costless then contracts with renegotiation are a welfare im-
provement over contracts without renegotiation.
The base parameter values that we use are listed in Table 4.1. When we don’t
vary the face value of the loan, it is assumed to be 80%.
Table 4.1: Base case parameter values for the numerical results when
income is not stochastic
This table reports the parameter values used in the base case for our numerical
results for the examples comparing recourse and no-recourse regimes with constant
income and no renegotiation.
Parameter Symbol Value
House Price H0 100
Recoursable income I 10
Face value of loan F 80
Foreclosure cost (lender) CFL 9
Foreclosure cost (borrower) CF 3
Renegotiation cost (lender) CRL 2
Renegotiation cost (borrower) CR 1
Psychic utility at H0 Ψ(H) 33
risk free rate r 0.047
Borrower time discount rate ρ 0.057
House dividend rate δ 0.05
House price volatility σ 0.15
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4.1.2 Recourse vs No-Recourse
This example illustrates the differences in outcomes with the introduction of
lender recourse by comparing two contracts that do not feature renegotiation. In the
recourse regime, we fix the extent of recourse to be 10. In Figure 4.1, we see that
in a regime with recourse we get lower equilibrium coupon rates and higher equity
values. In regimes with recourse, for a given coupon rate, the homeowner delays
default and stays longer in the contract. This is viewed favorably by the lenders and
gives a higher valuation of the debt. Therefore, for a given valuation of debt, the
recourse regime has a lower coupon for the borrower. As we vary the face value of
debt, we see that an optimal level of debt emerges in both the regimes. This is due
to the fact that the homeowner has a higher time discount parameter and is willing
to give up more of his future earnings for current wealth. As the borrower levers up,
the coupon rate on the entirety of his debt increases and at some point the marginal
gain from borrowing an additional dollar at a low rate is less than the marginal
loss in paying a higher coupon on the entire debt burden. In regimes with recourse,
for any level of debt, the coupon charged is lower, therefore it takes an increased
amount of levering up to hit a satiation point. Figure 4.2 shows how the sale and
default boundaries are affected by recourse. The lower debt burden for a given face
value of debt incentivizes the homeowner to stay longer in the house. In Figure 4.3,
we look at the valuation of the default and sale options at the inception of the loan.
We see that the in the no-recourse regime the option to default is considerably more
valuable. We also see that the option to default increases in leverage. The option
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of Equity value and mortgage rates across
Recourse and No-Recourse legal regimes when income is constant
This figure reports the value of equity less down-payment and equilibrium mortgage
rates across contracts in recourse and no-recourse regimes as we vary the face value
of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk
free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15%
and house price dividend rate δ : 5%.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of sale and default boundaries across Recourse
and No-Recourse legal regimes when income is constant
This figure reports the value of sale and default boundaries across contracts in
recourse and no-recourse regimes as we vary the face value of debt. The base
parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%,
subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price
dividend rate δ : 5%.
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to sell the house is a lot less valuable and a lot less sensitive to leverage.
Figure 4.3: Comparison of default and sale options across Recourse and
No-Recourse legal regimes when income is constant
This figure reports the value of default and sale options across contracts in recourse
and no-recourse regimes as we vary the face value of debt. The base parameters
used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective
discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend
rate δ : 5%.
4.1.3 Stochastic Income
We use the base parameter values listed in table ??. We look at the impact of
stochastic income on default decision, sale decision, equilibrium mortgage rates and
equilibrium equity values. We find that in the absence of recourse, income fluctua-
tion has no impact on any of the homeowner’s decisions. In a Recourse regime, we
see that the homeowner defaults at a lower price when he has more income to lose via
recourse. We also find that the homeowner sells at a higher price when his income is
lower. For the purposes of selling, the income level does not impact things directly.
The only difference between the high and low income states is that between the two
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Equity value in Stochastic income setting vs
constant income setting as debt varies
This figure reports the value of Equity value in Stochastic income setting vs
constant income setting contracts in recourse and no-recourse regimes as we vary
the face value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial
House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price
volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Income in the high state
is Ie = 9.84, while income in the low state is Iu=2.05
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of equilibrium mortgage rate in Stochastic income
setting vs constant income setting as debt varies
This figure reports the value of equilibrium mortgage rate in Stochastic income
setting vs constant income setting contracts in recourse and no-recourse regimes
as we vary the face value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows:
Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house
price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Income in the high
state is Ie = 9.84, while income in the low state is Iu=2.05
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Equity value in Stochastic income setting vs
constant income setting as income varies
This figure reports the value of Equity value in Stochastic income setting vs
constant income setting contracts in recourse and no-recourse regimes as we vary
the face value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial
House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price
volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Debt level F is 80.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of equilibrium mortgage rate in Stochastic income
setting vs constant income setting as income varies
This figure reports the value of equilibrium mortgage rate in Stochastic income
setting vs constant income setting contracts in recourse and no-recourse regimes
as we vary the face value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows:
Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house
price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Debt level F is 80.
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options to default. Since the option to default has a lower strike, it’s price is lower
near the sale point and the homeowner is willing to part with it earlier. See table 4.3
We see that, predictably, the overall mortgage rate when income is stochastic
is in between the no-recourse mortgage rate and the recourse mortgage rate if the
income was higher, see figure 4.5. We find that the lower mortgage rate in the
recourse-stochastic-income state leads the homeowners to have a higher optimal
leverage level than in the case without recourse. The optimal leverage level is in
between the no-recourse leverage and the recourse high constant level. See figure
4.4. We also look at the value of Equity and the coupon rate as we increased the
recoursable income, see figure 4.7 and figure 4.7 and we find that mortgage rates
reduce in recoursable income and the value of Equity increases in recoursable income.
Interestingly, in 4.10 we see that at optimal leverage, in regimes with recourse
default occurs at a higher house price. This result is counter to the intuition that
recourse would lead to fewer defaults and foreclosures.
Observation 4.1.8. In the presence of Labor Income uncertainty, the homeowner
defaults later in the state in which his income is higher but sells later in the state
in which his income is lower.
Observation 4.1.9. There exists an optimal debt level.




Both the bank and the homeowner suffer costly dead-weight loss associated
with the foreclosure process. It is in their interest to stave off these dead-weight
costs by renegotiating the terms of the contract. Bargaining power during renego-
tiations becomes a crucial variable in determining if the banks and the homeowners
are able to gain the surplus from postponing dead-weight losses associated with the
foreclosure process. We see that in the extreme case when bank’s have all the bar-
gaining power, we see a welfare gain relative to contracts without renegotiation. As
bargaining power shifts from debt to equity, any of the surplus that equity extracts
ex-post from debt is re-captured by debt via an increasing initial pre-renegotiation
mortgage rate. As equity bargaining power increases, we see the homeowner sue for
renegotiation sooner. In the extreme case where equity has all the bargaining power,
the homeowner renegotiates immediately and is able to extract the surplus from the
bank. These contracts will not be offered by the bank since they do not meet the
bank’s individual rationality constraint. We find a level of equity bargaining power
at which is becomes feasible for the bank to offer contracts with renegotiation. There
also exists an optimal level of bargaining power split.
Observation 4.1.11. When debt has all the bargaining power, contracts with one
renegotiation are a welfare improvement on contracts with renegotiation for both
recourse and non-recourse legal regimes. In contracts with renegotiation, the home-
owner has a higher optimal debt capacity.
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In figure 4.8, we see an example which compares the value equity gains above
the down-payment made by entering into a mortgage contract. We see that contracts
without renegotiation and without recourse are at the bottom, while contracts with
renegotiation and recourse have the highest equity valuation and also suggest the
highest optimal debt level. We can see from 4.9 that the renegotiation feature leads
to lower ex-ante mortgage rates and lower renegotiated coupons. Table 4.9 lists the
equity valuation and mortgage rates in an example in the No-Recourse regime when
bank has all the bargaining power. We find that equity is maximized at a debt level
of around 95%. Table 4.8 reports the renegotiation price and other boundaries
for the same contract. Table 4.9 on the other hand lists the equity values and
equilibrium mortgage rates for the same set of paramters but in a recourse legal
regime while table 4.8 looks at the boundaries for the same example. We see that
contracts with renegotiation in a recourse regime lead to the highest equity valuation
and higher debt capacity.
Observation 4.1.12. When Equity has all the bargaining power, the homeowner
defaults immediately to capture the surplus. These contracts violate the bank’s in-
dividual rationality constraint and will not be offered in equilibrium. There exists a
level of equity bargaining power above which contracts with renegotiation will not be
offered.
Figure 4.10 illustrates how extremely high ex-post bargaining power for equity
is detrimental for the homeowner. In this example, if equity has bargaining power
in excess of 85% he defaults immediately because he is better off doing that than
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Equity across Recourse and Renegotiation
when the bank has all the bargaining power
This figure reports the value of equity less down-payment across contracts with or
without renegotiation in recourse and no-recourse regimes as we vary the face value
of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk
free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15%
and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and
to the Borrower is 1.
staying current on his loan. Such contracts violate the bank’s individual rationality
constraint. For slightly lower equity bargaining power, we find that most of the
post-renegotiation surplus extracted by the homeonwer is given back to the bank
via an increasing ex-ante mortgage rate, see table 4.5.
Observation 4.1.13. There exists an optimal level of bargaining power. As equity’s
bargaining power increases from zero, his value increases but beyond a point, any
further increase in bargaining power lower equity’s valuation.
We see that the higher the equity’s bargaining power, the sooner he defaults.
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of Mortgage rates in contracts with or without
renegotiation when the bank has all the bargaining power in a No-
Recourse regime
This figure reports the initial and renegotiated mortgage rates in contracts with
renegotiation, in comparison to mortgage rates in contracts without renegotiation,
as we vary the face value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows:
Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house
price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation
to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Also in 4.5, we see that when equity has bargaining power of 20%, equity gets the
highest valuation at 77.5809. Any further increase in equity’s bargaining power is
detrimental as it lowers his valuation. Any surplus extracted by equity is recaputred
by debt via an increasing initial mortgage rate. Table 4.4 shows that with increasing
bargaining power, the homeowner renegotiates sooner. The table also shows that
the higher the homeowner bargaining power, the longer the homeowner stays in the
renegotiated contract.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of Equity value of immediate renegotiation
versus staying current and renegotiating later as the bargaining power
varies
This figure reports the value of Equity for varying levels of bargaining power during
renegotiation. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price
100, face value of Debt f 60, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%,
house price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of
Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
4.2 Conclusion
In this paper, we model strategic default and renegotiation in residential mort-
gage contracts and study how the feature of recourse alleviates some of the incentive
problems associated with debt and renegotiation. Our model is a sequential game
in continuous time and our equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect Nash equilib-
rium. We find that in the absence of recourse, the homeowner’s default decision is
independent of his personal wealth. In the absence of recourse, stochastic income
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Figure 4.11: Renegotiation price as the bargaining power varies
This figure reports how the optimal renegotiation price varying with bargaining
power during renegotiation. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial
House price 100, face value of Debt f 60, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount
rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%.
Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
does not influence the homeowner’s default and sale decisions. In the presence of
recourse, when the homeowner has stochastic income, we find that the homeowner
defaults later when his income is higher. Less intuitively, we see that the homeowner
sells later when his income is lower. Income uncertainty reduces the payoff that the
banks would receive in the presence of recourse and leads to lower welfare relative to
a constant income recourse case but higher welfare relative to that in the no-recourse
regime. We also find that in regimes with the provision of recourse the homeowners
stay longer in the homes before defaulting. We show that under recourse there are
lower default rates, lower coupon rates, higher debt capacity and increased welfare.
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Interestingly, we see that since recourse allows for a higher level of optimal leverage,
it also winds up having a higher probability of default and foreclosure. We also show
that contracts without renegotiation offer a welfare improvement if the homeowner
does not have excessive ex-post bargaining power during renegotiation. Both the
homeowner and the bank have an incentive to save on the dead-weight loss associ-
ated with foreclosure, however all the surplus that the homeowner extracts ex-post
is priced into the ex-ante mortgage rate further propelling the homeowner to default
sooner. In our model, both recourse and renegotiation with a balance of bargaining
power, serve to reduce the moral hazard associated with strategic default. The two
provisions are complimentary and work to increase ex-ante welfare, lower mortgage
rates and increase debt capacity. Homeowner bargaining power is an important
determinant of the feasibility of a mortgage modification program and subsequent
default rates. A legal regime that enables lender recourse reduces homeowner bar-
gaining power during a renegotiation. Lender recourse removes the incentives of the
homeowner to engage in foreclosure stripping and increases the reservation value of
the bank in the renegotiation process. Our paper provides a parsimonious framework
for analyzing the interaction of lender recourse with strategic default and mortgage
renegotiation. This model can be extended to include re-financing of mortgages and
stochastic interest rates that follow a continuous time Markov chain.
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Table 4.2: Base case parameter values for the numerical results when
income is stochastic
This table reports the parameter values used in the base case for our numerical
results when the homeowner’s income is stochastic.
Name Symbol Value
House Price H0 100
Face value of Debt F 80
Equity’s Foreclosure Cost CF 3
Debt’s Foreclosure cost CFL 9
Equity’s Renegotiation Cost CR 1
Debt’s Renegotiation cost CRL 3
Risk Free rate r 0.047
Equity Subjective Discount rate ρ 0.057
Home dividend rate δ 0.05
House Price volatility σ 0.15
High Income accrual rate ie 0.6
High Income present value Ie 9.84279
Low Income accrual rate iu 0
Low Income present value Iu 2.05058
High Income intensity rate λe 0.005
Low Income intensity rate λu 0.015
First characteristic root (jump into interior) k1 -1.70499
Second characteristic root (jump into interior) k2 2.97166
Third characteristic root (jump into interior) k3 -2.05842
Fourth characteristic root (jump into interior) k4 3.32509
First characteristic root (jump into default) m1 -1.79817
Second characteristic root (jump into default) m2 3.06484
First characteristic root (jump into sale) m∗1 -1.97456
Second characteristic root (jump into sale) m∗2 3.24123
Psychic Utility parameter p 0.15
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Table 4.3: Free boundaries under Recourse as initial loan-to-value varies
when income is stochastic
This table reports the renegotiation and sale boundaries at the high and low income
levels for varying degrees of initial Loan-to-value. The base parameters used here
are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate
ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%.
Debt Default Default Sale Sale
boundary boundary boundary boundary
High Income Low Income High Income Low Income
99. 36.5035 42.9219 416.9 418.032
95. 32.6204 38.9868 432.598 433.449
90. 28.2622 34.5552 446.016 446.629
85. 24.3127 30.5209 454.421 454.868
82. 22.1005 28.251 457.595 457.966
80. 20.683 26.7917 459.055 459.382
75. 17.32 23.31 460.731 460.968
70. 14.1926 20.0382 460.022 460.189
65. 11.2863 16.9518 457.35 457.464
55. 6.15955 11.2879 447.37 447.415
50. 4.00434 8.71122 440.565 440.589
45. 2.22164 6.32781 432.852 432.864
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Table 4.4: Boundaries in Contracts with Renegotiation in a Recourse
regime as the bargaining power varies
This table reports the renegotiation and sale boundaries of the initial contract
and the default and sale boundaries of the renegotiated contract for varying
degrees of bargaining power. The base parameters used here are as follows:
Initial House price 100, face value of debt F is 60, risk free rate 4.7%, sub-
jective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price
dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Bank Initial Renegotiation Renegotiated Renegotiated
Bargaining Contract Price Contract Contract
Power Sale Price Sale Price Default Price
100.% 455.621 14.7663 535.783 4.59363
95.% 455.243 15.6349 541.648 4.31696
90.% 454.775 16.5252 547.345 4.05327
85.% 454.214 17.4372 552.879 3.80221
80.% 453.556 18.3714 558.252 3.56355
75.% 452.796 19.3289 563.463 3.33719
70.% 451.93 20.3112 568.508 3.12305
65.% 450.95 21.3202 573.383 2.9211
60.% 449.851 22.3582 578.082 2.73133
55.% 448.623 23.4278 582.596 2.55372
50.% 447.257 24.5322 586.917 2.38824
45.% 445.742 25.6745 591.036 2.23481
40.% 444.065 26.8585 594.944 2.09329
35.% 442.212 28.0875 598.634 1.96343
30.% 440.166 29.3644 602.106 1.84466
25.% 437.908 30.691 605.372 1.7361
20.% 435.419 32.0668 608.457 1.63642
15.% N/A 100 469.846 7.98444
10.% N/A 100 485.83 7.12378
5.% N/A 100 501.764 6.28751
0.% N/A 100 517.649 5.47923
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Table 4.5: Renegotiation price and equilibrium coupon rates in Contracts
with Renegotiation in a Recourse regime as the bargaining power varies
This table reports the renegotiation price and the equilibrium coupon rates of the
initial contract and the renegotiated contract. The base parameters used here are
as follows: Initial House price 100, face value of debt F is 60, risk free rate 4.7%,
subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price
dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Debt Bargaining Equity Debt Renegotiation Initial Renegotiated
Power Value Value Price Coupon Coupon
100% 77.5624 60. 14.7663 0.0475407 0.0400334
95% 77.5705 60. 15.6349 0.0475814 0.0394812
90% 77.5763 60. 16.5252 0.0476312 0.0389443
85% 77.5797 60. 17.4372 0.0476905 0.0384223
80% 77.5809 60. 18.3714 0.0477598 0.037915
75% 77.5799 60. 19.3289 0.0478394 0.0374227
70% 77.5767 60. 20.3112 0.0479301 0.0369455
65% 77.5715 60. 21.3202 0.0480325 0.0364841
60% 77.5643 60. 22.3582 0.0481472 0.0360391
55% 77.5549 60. 23.4278 0.0482754 0.0356113
50% 77.5435 60. 24.5322 0.0484179 0.0352014
45% 77.5299 60. 25.6745 0.0485761 0.0348105
40% 77.5142 60. 26.8585 0.0487512 0.0344394
35% 77.4963 60. 28.0875 0.048945 0.0340888
30% 77.4761 60. 29.3644 0.0491591 0.0337587
25% 77.4535 60. 30.691 0.0493958 0.033448
20% 77.4286 60. 32.0668 0.0496573 0.0331545
15% 77.7526 56.3156 100 N/A 0.0462
10% 79.2844 54.5632 100 N/A 0.0447123
5% 80.8212 52.7909 100 N/A 0.0432246
0% 82.3623 51. 100 N/A 0.0417369
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Table 4.6: Boundaries in Contracts with Renegotiation in a Recourse
regime when the Bank has all the bargaining power
This table reports the renegotiation and sale boundaries of the initial contract and
the default and sale boundaries of the renegotiated contract for varying levels of
face-value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price
100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility
σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is
2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Initial Renegotiation Renegotiated Contract Renegotiated Contract
Debt Sale Price Price Sale Price Default Price
50. 441.643 8.34434 493.957 2.09705
55. 449.074 11.5576 514.888 3.25618
60. 455.621 14.7662 535.784 4.59359
65. 461.11 17.9659 556.065 6.09436
70. 465.342 21.1805 575.287 7.75608
75. 468.077 24.4427 593.07 9.58479
80. 469.019 27.7889 609.037 11.5937
85. 467.781 31.2601 622.769 13.8037
90. 463.847 34.9055 633.75 16.2457
95. 456.488 38.789 641.277 18.9659
99. 447.426 42.1273 644.131 21.3896
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Table 4.7: Equity values and mortgage rates in Contracts with Renegoti-
ation in a Recourse regime when the Bank has all the bargaining power
This table reports the Equity value, Debt value and coupon rates for the initial
and the renegotiated contracts as we vary the levels of face-value of debt. The base
parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%,
subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price
dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Equity less Equity at Debt at Initial Renegotiated
Debt Equity down-payment Renegotiation Renegotiation Coupon Coupon
50. 86.0237 36.0237 3.13563 38.0825 0.0471666 0.0413392
55. 81.8106 36.8106 4.17491 40.534 0.0473237 0.0406293
60. 77.5624 37.5624 5.004 42.8692 0.0475407 0.0400333
65. 73.2734 38.2734 5.6585 45.1673 0.0478201 0.039576
70. 68.9366 38.9366 6.1717 47.4841 0.0481659 0.0392648
75. 64.543 39.543 6.56998 49.8632 0.0485845 0.0391008
80. 60.0814 40.0814 6.8734 52.3434 0.0490852 0.0390846
85. 55.5371 40.5371 7.09705 54.9637 0.0496817 0.0392195
90. 50.8903 40.8903 7.25215 57.7688 0.0503943 0.0395149
95. 46.1129 41.1129 7.34679 60.816 0.0512537 0.0399893
99. 42.1691 41.1691 7.38263 63.4816 0.0520787 0.0405202
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Table 4.8: Boundaries in Contracts with Renegotiation in a No-Recourse
regime when the Bank has all the bargaining power
This table reports the renegotiation and sale boundaries of the initial contract and
the default and sale boundaries of the renegotiated contract for varying levels of
face-value of debt. The base parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price
100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility
σ : 15% and house price dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is
2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Initial Renegotiation Renegotiated Contract Renegotiated Contract
Debt Sale Price Price Sale Price Default Price
45. 430.292 12.5153 501.365 3.77238
50. 436.607 15.6707 522.049 5.18189
55. 441.824 18.8306 541.919 6.75349
60. 445.738 22.0216 560.571 8.48787
65. 448.099 25.2763 577.64 10.3932
70. 448.593 28.6309 592.753 12.4846
75. 446.811 32.1268 605.48 14.7851
80. 442.201 35.8152 615.273 17.3287
85. 433.975 39.7641 621.367 20.1669
90. 420.944 44.0747 622.6 23.3809
95. 401.117 48.917 616.969 27.1137
99. 377.875 53.3949 604.895 30.6626
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Table 4.9: Equity values and mortgage rates in Contracts with Renego-
tiation in a No-Recourse regime when the Bank has all the bargaining
power
This table reports the Equity value, Debt value and coupon rates for the initial
and the renegotiated contracts as we vary the levels of face-value of debt. The base
parameters used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%,
subjective discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price
dividend rate δ : 5%. Cost of Renegtiation to the Bank is 2 and to the Borrower is 1.
Equity less Equity at Debt at Initial Renegotiated
Debt Equity down-payment Renegotiation Renegotiation Coupon Coupon
45. 90.0453 35.0453 14.021 29.5635 0.0474861 0.0386785
50. 85.7855 35.7855 14.7376 31.8907 0.0477634 0.0381888
55. 81.4838 36.4838 15.299 34.2058 0.0481078 0.0378639
60. 77.1328 37.1328 15.735 36.5582 0.0485236 0.0377025
65. 72.723 37.723 16.0686 38.9884 0.049018 0.0377002
70. 68.2426 38.2426 16.3174 41.5337 0.0496021 0.0378551
75. 63.6761 38.6761 16.4946 44.2335 0.0502922 0.0381702
80. 59.0021 39.0021 16.6099 47.1344 0.0511125 0.0386564
85. 54.1902 39.1902 16.6703 50.298 0.0521002 0.0393369
90. 49.1929 39.1929 16.6801 53.8155 0.0533156 0.0402558
95. 43.9276 38.9276 16.6402 57.84 0.0548682 0.0414996
99. 39.4123 38.4123 16.5698 61.6239 0.0565035 0.0428516
Table 4.10: Comparison of default boundaries across regimes for optimal
debt
This table reports the default values across recourse and no-recourse regimes and
for constant and stochastic income for optimal level of debt. The base parameters
used here are as follows: Initial House price 100, risk free rate 4.7%, subjective
discount rate ρ : 5.7%, house price volatility σ : 15% and house price dividend
rate δ : 5%. High income is Ie = 9.84 and low income is Iu=2.05.
Optimal Debt Default boundary
Constant Income No Recourse 70 22.1136
Constant Income Recourse 82 22.27
Stochastic Income Recourse (High) 80 20.683
Stochastic Income Recourse (Low) 80 26.7917
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Chapter A: Stochastic Labor Income
A.1 Stochastic Labor Income
A.1.1 Derivation of the Value Functions
We now derive the functional forms that the value of Debt and Equity will
take. We’ll use the dynamic programming recursive relation from the principal
of optimality to derive the Ordinary Differential Equations that debt and equity
satisfy. Once we have the differential equations, we’ll solve them using the method
of variation of parameters to arrive at the functional forms up to some constants.
Then we will use the various constraints that we had listed earlier to solve for the
unknown coefficients and also the unknown boundary points.
Theorem A.1.1. The Value functions Je and Ju satisfy the following system of
linked ODEs.









− (λe + ρ)Je(Ht) + Ju(Ht)λe









− (λu + ρ)Ju(Ht) + Je(Ht)λu
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e−ρs(ie + ψ(H) + δHt+s − c1F )ds+ e−ρhJe(Ht+h)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸





















e−ρs(iu + ψ(H) + δHt+s − c1F )ds+ e−ρhJu(Ht+h)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸





















































































































































































































































We divide by h and then take limh→0 to get:
0 =









− (λe + ρ)Je(Ht) + Ju(Ht)λe
Now all that changes in the regions where only one income level exists is the Ju(Ht)
becomes a different function, a boundary payoff.
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So when you jump into default:









− (λe + ρ)JD(Ht)− CFλe


















So when you jump into Sale:









− (λu + ρ)JS + (Ht + Ie − F )λu
















− 2(δ + λu)
σ2Ht
Similarly, debt satisfies the following ordinary differential equations.
Theorem A.1.2. The Value functions V e andV u satisfy the following system of
linked ODEs.









− (λe + ρ)V e(Ht) + V u(Ht)λe









− (λu + ρ)V u(Ht) + V e(Ht)λu
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JS = −λuF + cF
σ2H2
Using the method of variation of parameters we solve these ODEs. For Equity,
the value functions consists of five separate components. The components are the
value of the house, the present value of gaining a lifetime of psychic utility from
ownership, the present value of future income, the present value of the debt if paid
in perpetuity and finally the option to default on the debt and the option to sell
the house. Debt value function has three components. The first is the present value
of receiving debt payments in perpetuity and then second and third are the short
positions in the two options that the homeowner holds.
Theorem A.1.3. Equity has the following functional form. The Hk terms represent
the options to sell and default. In addition to the option, Equity valuation consists of
Income, Psychic utility of ownership, private valuation of the house and the private
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((λu + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
(δ + λu)H








((λe + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
δH

























V D = LD1H
m1 + LD2H
m2 +





where k1, k2 solve the first equation and k3, k4 solve the second equation













m1,m2 satisfy the following characteristic equation
m(m− 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2





2 satisfy the following characteristic equations
m(m− 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2
m− 2(λu + ρ)
σ2
= 0
Proof. We’ll first solve the single ODEs and we’ll use the method of variation of
parameters to solve our ODEs. We’ll solve in detail for the “Jump to Sale” ODE
and then apply the results to the “Jump to Default” ODE which has identical
homogeneous part and differs only in the particular solution.




















Where m1,m2 satisfy the following characteristic equation
m(m− 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2




Let Jp = C1(H)H
m1 + C2(H)H
m2 be the particular solution to our ODE. Then Jp

























































Taking ψ(H) = Hp and integrating, we get:
C2 = −





− 2(δ + λe)H
−m2+1
(−m2 + 1)(m2 −m1)σ2
C1 = +






















(−m1 + 1)(m2 −m1)σ2





− 2(δ + λe)H
(−m2 + 1)(m2 −m1)σ2
= +







































As m1,m2 solve m(m− 1) + 2(r−δ)σ2 m−
2(λe+ρ)
σ2




















p(p− 1)σ2 + (r − δ)p− (λe + ρ))
− (δ + λe)H
(r − δ − (λe + ρ))
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So








((λe + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
(δ + λe)H










((λe + ρ)− 12p(p− 1)σ2 − (r − δ)p)
+
δH
((λe + ρ)− r + δ)
Now we’ll solve the linked ODEs, again using the method of variation in parameters
























2(iu + ψ(Ht) + δHt − cF )
σ2H2t
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The ODEs have a homogeneous solution and a particular solution.
Je = Jeh + J
e
p
Ju = Juh + J
u
p
We’ll first determine the general solution to the corresponding homogeneous
system of differential equations. We hypothesize that the general solution is a linear
combinations of linearly independent combination of power functions which take the
following form:
Jeh(H) = A
eHk , Juh (H) = A
uHk
Substituting these expressions into the original system and collecting coeffi-
cients of Ae and Au, we obtain the following system for A and B:
k(k − 1) + 2(r−δ)σ2 k − 2(λe+ρ)σ2 2λeσ2
2λu
σ2












The determinant of this system must vanish for nontrivial solutions to exist. Hence
follows the characteristic equation for the exponent k:
(
















Let Q2 = k(k − 1) + 2(r−δ)σ2 k −
2ρ
σ2


























So our four roots are solutions to the following two quadratics:













In contrast, the characteristic equation in the single ODE case was:








Let, k1 > k2 solve (A.2), k3 > k4 solve (A.3) and m1 > m2 solve (A.4).








< 0 we know that k1 > 1 > 0 > k2. Since (A.3) and (A.4) are
downward translations of (A.2), we get that k3 > m1 > k1 > 1 > 0 > k2 > m2 > k4
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Now, following the method of variation of parameters, we’ll assume that a









































































































i ki(ki − 1)Hki−1
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ki−1 = −2(iu + ψ(H) + δH − cF )
σ2H2
(A.8)
Solving this algebraic system below will give us closed from solutions for v
′
i(H) ∀i,
which we can then integrate on a suitable interval to arrive at expressions for
vi(t) ∀i.

1 1 1 1

















































− 1)(k1 − k2)












− 1)(k1 − k2)
+


























σ2(−k1)(−λuλe − 1)(k1 − k2)
− 2H
p−k1
σ2(p− k1)(k1 − k2)
− 2(δH
−k1+1)










σ2(−k2)(−λuλe − 1)(k1 − k2)
+
2Hp−k2
σ2(p− k2)(k1 − k2)
+
2(δH−k2+1)






σ2(−k3)(−λuλe − 1)(k3 − k4)
Ae4v4(H) =
(−2ie + 2iu)H−k4

































































































Recall that k1, k2 solve the first equation and k3, k4 solve the second equation

















2(ρ+ λe + λu)
σ2
(1− k2)(1− k1) = −
2(ρ+ δ − r)
σ2
(p− k2)(p− k1) = −

















































































(λu + λe)(ρ+ λe + λu)
− λeiu











(λu + λe)(ρ+ λe + λu)
− λeiu








(ρ+ λu + λe)ρ
+
λeiu




− (ie − iu)λe














(ρ+ δ − r)
Similarly, we get









































(ρ+ δ − r)
The value functions for debt, namely, V e, V u, V S and V D can be derived similarly.
We now have twenty one unknowns, namely eight equity coefficients, A1, A2, A3, A4,
AD1, AD2, AS1, AS2, eight debt coefficients, L1, L2, L3, L4, LD1, LD2, LS1, LS2, four
boundaries HDD,H0D,H0S,HSS and the equilibrium mortgage rate c. We solve
the system of 21 constraints, listed earlier, for the 21 unknowns.
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A.2 Transversality Condition











We will use the method of variation in parameters to find general and partic-























2(iu + ψ(Ht) + δHt − cF )
σ2H2t
The ODEs have a homogeneous solution and a particular solution.
Je = Jeh + J
e
p




We will first determine the general solution to the corresponding homogeneous
system of differential equations. We hypothesize that the general solution is a linear
combinations of linearly independent combination of power functions which take the
following form:
Jeh(H) = A
eHk , Juh (H) = A
uHk
Substituting these expressions into the original system and collecting coeffi-
cients of Ae and Au, we obtain the following system for A and B:
k(k − 1) + 2(r−δ)σ2 k − 2(λe+ρ)σ2 2λeσ2
2λu
σ2












The determinant of this system must vanish for nontrivial solutions to exist. Hence
follows the characteristic equation for the exponent k:
(
















Eyeballing the above equation, we see that the quartic will admit solutions at
the zeros of the following two quadratic equations:
94















Let k1, k2 be the zeros of Q1,2 and k3, k4 be the zeros of Q3,4. Since the product
of the roots − 2ρ
σ2
, is negative in Q3,4 we know that the roots k3, k4 have opposite
signs. Also since the coefficient of k2 is positive, we know that Q3,4 is convex. Now
Q1,2(x) = Q3,4 − 2(λe+λu)σ2 where
2(λe+λu)
σ2
> 0. So we know that the roots of Q3,4
are also of opposite signs and given a particular sign, are of a larger magnitude.
Without loss of generality, we label the roots such that k1 > k3 > 0 > k4 > k2.
When the roots of the above equation, say k1, k2, k3, k4, are distinct then the




















Now, following the method of variation of parameters, we’ll assume that a









































































































i ki(ki − 1)Hki−1
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ki−1 = −2(iu + ψ(H) + δH − cF )
σ2H2
(B.8)
With the above restrictions in place, we can verify that Jep and J
u
p satisfy our
original system of inhomogeneous differential equations.
Now equations (B.5),(B.6),(B.7) and (B.8) form a system of linear equations for the
functions v
′
i(H) i = 1, ..4. Solving this algebraic system below will give us closed
from solutions for v
′
i(H) ∀i, which we can then integrate on a suitable interval to
arrive at expressions for vi(t) ∀i.
Recall that:
Au1 = −













































































































We invert this matrix, solve for v
′











δ + ρ− r











δ + ρ− r
+ Iu + Ψ(H)
Therefore, combining the particular and the homogeneous solutions, we have our
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value functions:










δ + ρ− r
+ Ie + Ψ(H)












δ + ρ− r
+ Iu + Ψ(H)
We take ψ(H) = H0.25 then it turns out that Ψ(H) = H
0.25
−0.25(r+δ)+ρ+0.09375σ2 .
B.1.2 Ordinary differential equations
B.1.3 No recourse equity
We use the method of variation in parameters to find general and particular








J = −2(ψ(H)− cF + δH)
σ2H2
The solution will be the sum of the homogeneous solution and the particular
solution.
J(H) = Jh(H) + Jp(H)
We first determine the general solution to the corresponding homogeneous part of
the equation. We hypothesize that the general solution is a linear combination of




Substituting these expressions into the homogeneous part of the original equa-
tion, we obtain the following relation
(






The coefficient of this equation must vanish for nontrivial solutions to exist.
Hence follows the characteristic equation for the exponent k:





When the roots of the above equation, say k1, k2, are distinct then the general






Now, following the method of variation of parameters, we assume that the
particular solution to the inhomogeneous part of our ordinary differential equation

















































ki−1 = −2(ψ(H)− cF + δH)
σ2H2
(B.13)

















































= −2(ψ(H)− cF + δH)
σ2H2
Now equations (B.12),(B.13) form a system of linear algebraic equations for the
functions v
′
i(H) i = 1, 2. Solving this algebraic system below will give us closed
from solutions for v
′
i(H) ∀i, which we can then integrate on a suitable interval to




















































(1− k2)(−k1 + k2)σ2
+ Ψ∗∗(H)
Therefore


































































because k1 and k2 solve





















(δ + ρ− r)
+ Ψ(H) (B.16)
We take ψ(H) = H0.25 then it turns out that Ψ(H) = H
0.25
−0.25(r+δ)+ρ+0.09375σ2 . The
same as what we had derived in the recourse linked equity case.






























The solutions to the above ODEs are as follows:
SJe = SAH l1 + SBH l2 +












δ+ρ+λe−r + Ψ̂(H) if H < F − Iu




δ+ρ+λe−r + Ψ̂(H) if H > F − Iu
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Where l1 and l2 are solutions to the following quadratic:
k(k − 1) + 2(r − δ)
σ2
k − 2(λe + ρ)
σ2
= 0
The coefficients SA, SB,DA and DB are determined by boundary conditions.




Proposition B.3.1. The present value of future income, given some current state
of employment, is given as follows. Ie is the present value when the current state is




− (ie − iu)λe





























































































(r + λu)(r + λe)
+ Ie
λuλe
(r + λu)(r + λe)
=
ie(r + λu)
r(r + λe + λu)
+
iu(λe)




− (ie − iu)λe
r(r + λe + λu)










Post renegotiation, for a given H1R, the Bank, given some bargaining power,
chooses a coupon rate. The two extreme cases here are:




− CR = H1R− CFL (B.19)
The other coefficients are found by solving:










(ρ+ δ − r)










(ρ+ δ − r)
= 1






























= H0D + Ie− CFL
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The above six equations are linear in four variables, A0, B0, L0 and M0 and non-
linear in H0D,H0S. We can reduce the system to two equations in H0S,H0D and
c0. Lets call them
F1(H0S,H0D, c0) = 0 (B.20)
F2(H0S,H0D, c0) = 0 (B.21)
Equations (B.20) and (B.21) implicitly define H0S and H0D as functions of c0 and




. We have solved L0 and




















































Ultimately, we have three equations (B.20), (B.21) and (3.8) which we will use to
solve for H0S, H0D and c0
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B.4.2 Pre-renegotiation






For a given contract, the homeonwer decides where to sell and where to renegotiate.
From No-Arbitrage conditions, we get smooth pasting and value matching. The
debt is a martingale, so we get value matching as well. First we write down the












Now we write the Equity value matching and smooth pasting conditions at the sale
boundary.










(ρ+ δ − r)














We use equations (B.27), (B.28), (B.25), (B.26) and (B.24) to solve for L1, M1,
A1, B1 and c1. That leaves us with the value matching and smooth pasting of equity
to solve for H1S and H1R. These value matching equation is










(ρ+ δ − r)
=










(ρ+ δ − r)
− CR
(B.29)
The smooth pasting equation is c0, H0S and H0D are implicit functions of H1R.
They are implicitly defined by these three equations:
F1(H0S,H0D, c0, H1R) = 0 (B.30)
F2(H0S,H0D, c0, H1R) = 0 (B.31)
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